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SHOULD RACE BE A FACTOR IN LAW SCHOOL
ADMISSIONS? A STUDY OF HOPWOOD v. TEXAS AND HOW
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE MAKES RACE-BASED
CLASSIFICATIONS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
I. INTRODUCTION
In promoting a color-blind society, America should not violate
the very principles underlying its color-blind Constitution.' Any
analysis of affirmative action must begin with the premise that racial
equality is a goal that all members of American society share. Start-
ing from this premise, the differences of opinion center around the
methods used to attain this goal.
Today's typical law student grew up during a time when the
American government advanced meaningful policies aimed at pro-
tecting all races from discriminatory treatment. 2 Americans raised
1. The Declaration of Independence and the original United States Constitution
did not extend egalitarian ideals and rights to everyone in America. See A.
LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATrER OF COLOR 4-7 (1978). While the Fram-
ers succeeded in alienating those precious inalienable rights from Africans, to-
day's Constitution permits no such exclusions. See U.S. CONsT. amends. XIII,
XIV & XV; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Purchased at the price of immeasurable
human suffering, the equal protection principle reflects our Nation's under-
standing that such classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on the
individual and our society."). However, many dispute whether the Constitution
ought to be color-blind:
Despite the suggestion that our Constitution should be "color-blind,"
it has long been recognized that this is a misleading metaphor. Just
as race has played a crucial role in our nation's past, so it must play
a role in the present-whether to eradicate racial distinctions from
our future, or to overcome the lingering effects of racial discrimina-
tion, or to achieve racial pluralism and diversity without racial
domination.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16-22, at 1521-22 (2d ed.
1988).
2. Persons born in America during the late 1960s and early 1970s did not grow
up in a society that legally sanctioned racism. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28
U.S.C. § 1447, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975(a)-1975(d), 2000(a), 2000(d), 2000(e)
(1988); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973(b), 1973(aa)-(1a),
1973 (aa)-(6) (1988); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (1991); Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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and educated in a society that teaches equality and does not toler-
ate racism are more apt to hold egalitarian views than individuals
who grew up in America's past when intolerance was taught and
segregation sanctioned. While we must never forget America's his-
tory of racism and intolerance,3 with every new generation of Amer-
icans we leave that past further behind. In essence, society can re-
member the past without repeating its mistakes.
This Comment narrowly focuses on four specific areas. Part II
examines two different approaches for determining whether the
Framers' original intent of the Equal Protection Clause envisioned
affirmative action programs.4 Part III examines Supreme Court pre-
cedent in the area of race-based classifications. 5 Part IV reviews and
analyzes Hopwood v. Texas,6 a recent affirmative action decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.7 Part V
questions the constitutional framework presently utilized by the Su-
preme Court in affirmative action cases and advocates a return to
the principles espoused by earlier Courts.8 Part VI concludes that
race should not play a role in a law school's admissions process.9
II. AN EXAMINATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The Equal Protection Clause does not require that "everyone
must be treated equally." 10 Rather, it commands that everyone must
be treated equally with respect to race." Thus, it is appropriate to
question whether a government entity could adopt any affirmative
3. See F. Michael Higginbotham, Affirmative Action, Selective Memory Loss, and the
Mistakes of Adarand, 95 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 415, 415 (1995).
4. See infra notes 10-59 and accompanying text. Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. See infra notes 60-180 and accompanying text.
6. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
7. See infra notes 181-267 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 268-287 and accompanying text.
9. See infra text accompanying note 288.
10. Terrance Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility
and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. Rrv. 653, 655 (1975). Professor Sandalow
noted that the government may tax individuals at different rates. See id.
11. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1995); see also Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978).
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action program and remain true to this dictate. To determine what
equal treatment with respect to race truly means, one must first at-
tempt to decipher the original intent of the Equal Protection
Clause.
Commentators have advanced two general frameworks for ana-
lyzing whether the Equal Protection Clause 2 was originally intended
to permit the government to adopt affirmative action programs.
The methods that academicians have developed for unraveling the
original intent of the Equal Protection Clause vary markedly, as do
the labels affixed to each method. This Comment attempts to place
the most commonly asserted approaches to the original intent of
the Equal Protection Clause into two pigeonholes: (1) a plain mean-
ing, text-based approach and (2) a more open-ended original un-
derstanding approach. 3 These labels are merely academic in that
Supreme Court opinions might intimate their acceptance, but have
yet to clearly articulate their meaning or adopt them as controlling
in any Equal Protection Clause case.
A. The Text-Based Approach
The starting point for decoding the meaning of any clause in
the Constitution is its text. The text-based approach to the Equal
Protection Clause focuses primarily on the Clause's text in an at-
tempt to decipher its plain meaning.' 4 When competing claims
about the meaning of the text exist, a textualist attempts to "apply
12. Although found only in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal
Protection Clause applies to both federal actions through the Fifth Amend-
ment and state actions, through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Adarand, 515
U.S. at 217-18 (reviewing cases addressing whether equal protection is ana-
lyzed differently under the Fifth Amendment, as opposed to the Fourteenth
Amendment, and finding that it is not).
13. Advocates of the original understanding approach argue that the intent be-
hind the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was to en-
sure that states did not discriminate against freed slaves. -See generally Carl E.
Brody, Jr., A Historical Review of Affirmative Action and the Interpretation of its Leg-
islative Intent by the Supreme Court, 29 AKRON L. REv. 291 (1996) (discussing and
supporting an original understanding approach to the Equal Protection
Clause); Carl L. Livingston, Jr., Affirmative Action on Trial the Retraction of Affirm-
ative Action and the Case for its Retention, 40 How. LJ. 145 (1996); Melissa L.
Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REv.
245 (1997); Justin Schwartz, Comment, A Not Quite Color-Blind Constitution: Ra-
cial Discrimination and Racial Preference in Justice O'Connor's "Newest" Equal Protec-
tion Jurisprudence, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1055, 1062 (1997).
14. See Christo Lassiter, The New Race Cases and the Politics of Public Policy, 12 J.L. &
POL. 411, 447 (1996).
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the law as it plainly reads" in light of past judicial interpretations of
accepted canons of construction.
1 5
This approach leads certain textualists to assert that the com-
mand of the Equal Protection Clause is self-evident-no language
could be clearer than "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law
which . . . den[ies] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."'16 The language in the Clause does not limit
its scope to protecting minorities; its egalitarian concept applies to
any and all persons.'7 Even though the aim of the Civil War Amend-
ments was to provide aid to freed slaves,'8 " [t]here is ... no textual
support for the argument that these rights apply differently to peo-
ple of different races-the [A]mendments say everything about
equality and nothing about permissible discrimination." 19 The com-
mand of equal protection, therefore, is often characterized as a
mandate for color-blind laws.20
15. Id.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see John Marquez Lundin, The Call for a Color-
Blind Law, 30 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 407, 438 (1997) (supporting the use
of the Equal Protection Clause's text to ascertain its plain meaning); Russell
N. Watterson, Jr., Adarand Constructors v. Pena: Madisonian Theory as a Justifi-
cation for Lesser Constitutional Scrutiny of Federal Race-Conscious Legislation, 1 BYU
L. Rev. 301, 326 (1996) (arguing that the most reliable means of interpreting
a constitutional Amendment is to consider the plain meaning of its text); L.
Darnell Weeden, Yo, Hopwood, Saying No to Race-Based Affirmative Action is the
Right Thing to do from an Afrocentric Perspective, 27 CUMB. L. REv. 533, 542 (1996)
(supporting a plain meaning approach to interpreting the text of the Equal
Protection Clause that would proscribe race-based classifications); see also Fulli-
love v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 526 (1980) (Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ., dissent-
ing) (explaining the simple command of the equal protection clause). But see
Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise-Section One in the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933 (1984) (criticizing a plain
meaning approach to the Fourteenth Amendment as simplistic).
17. See Weeden, supra note 16 at 542-43; see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 526 (1980) (Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (explaining that the ar-
bitrary or unfair effect of a racially discriminatory law violates Equal Protec-
tion regardless of the race of the individual harmed).
18. See Jonathan L. Entin, An Uneasy Case for Affirmative Action: Some Notes from
Law, History, and Demography, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1191, 1192 (1996) ("Al-
though the Equal Protection Clause is written in general terms . .. the origi-
nal understanding was that this provision was designed primarily to protect
the rights of African Americans.").
19. Lundin, supra note 16, at 440-41.
20. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (opining that "only a social emergency rising to the level of im-
minent danger to life and limb . . . can justify an exception to the principle
398 [Vol. 27
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1. Justices Who Emphasize the Plain Meaning of the Text
Over time, certain Justices have emphasized the plain meaning
of the text of the Equal Protection Clause when analyzing the con-
stitutionality of affirmative action programs. Justice Powell articu-
lated this plain meaning, text-based approach in Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke, when he wrote: "The guarantee of equal
protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual
and something else when applied to a person of another color. If
both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal."
21
A clearer example of this approach surfaced one year later in Fulli-
love v. Klutznick,22 when Justice Stewart persuasively asserted:
The command of the equal protection guarantee is simple
but unequivocal: In the words of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: "No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal
protection of the laws." Nothing in this language singles
out some "persons" for more "equal" treatment than
others.... From the perspective of a person detrimentally
affected by a racially discriminatory law, the arbitrariness
and unfairness is entirely the same, whatever his skin color
and whatever the law's purpose, be it purportedly "for the
promotion of the public good" or otherwise.
23
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment that [o]ur Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens" (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); Lundin, supra note 16, at 427.
21. 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978). For an analysis of the splintered decision of the
Bakke Court, see infra notes 44-45, 112-17 and accompanying text.
22. 448 U.S. 448, 524 (1979) (Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
23. Id. at 526 (Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice
Stewart's dissenting opinion appears to be based on a textualist interpretation
of the Constitution. See id. at 526-27. Justice Stewart reached the preceding
conclusion by way of the following analysis:
No one disputes the self-evident proposition that Congress has broad
discretion under its spending power to disburse the revenues of the
United States as it deems best and to set conditions on the receipt of
the funds disbursed. No one disputes that Congress has the authority
under the Commerce Clause to regulate contracting practices on fed-
erally funded public works projects, or that it enjoys broad powers
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment "to enforce by appropriate
legislation" the provisions of that Amendment. But these self-evident
truisms do not begin to answer the question before us in this case.
For in the exercise of its powers, Congress must obey the Constitu-
tion just as the legislatures of all the States must obey the Constitu-
tion in the exercise of their powers.
1998] 399
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In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,24 Justice Scalia based his
opinion on a textual interpretation of several constitutional provi-
sions.21 In Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, he succinctly stated
that the "government can never have a 'compelling interest' in dis-
criminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past ra-
cial discrimination in the opposite direction. ' 26 In perhaps his most
persuasive argument, Justice Scalia wrote:
[To] pursue the concept of racial entitlement-even for the
most admirable and benign of purposes-is to reinforce
and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that
produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In
the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is
Id. In light of this approach, Justice Stewart would have held that the Minority
Business Enterprise Provision at issue in Fullilove violated the Equal Protection
Clause. See id. at 527.
24. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
25. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia's text-based analysis
proceeded as follows:
[U]nder our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a
creditor or debtor race. That concept is alien to the Constitution's
focus upon the individual, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or
shall any State . . . deny to any person" the equal protection of the
laws) (emphasis added), and its rejection of dispositions based on
race, see U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (prohibiting abridgment of the
right to vote "on account of race") or based on blood, see U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 3 ("[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corrup-
tion of Blood"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No Title of Nobility shall be
granted by the United States").
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
While Justice Thomas may not have taken a strict textualist approach, he
reached the same result in his interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Relying on the Declaration of Independence, Justice Thomas reasoned that
despite the best intentions, there is a principle that "under our Constitution,
the government may not make distinctions on the basis of race. . . . There
can be no doubt that the paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of [race-
based programs] is at war with the principle of inherent equality that under-
lies and infuses our Constitution." Id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Adarand highlights Justices Scalia and Thomas's shared view that affirma-
tive action should be abandoned entirely. See Livingston, supra note 13, at
164. Their ideas do not ignore originalism; the view they hold is simply that
affirmative actions runs contrary to the original understanding of the Four-
teenth Amendment. See id. at 176.
26. Adarand, 551 U.S. at 239 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488




From a textual standpoint, it seems self-evident that in order to
ensure an eternally fair approach to the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Equal Protection Clause should be interpreted to establish a per
se prohibition on race-based classifications. A truly equal approach
to interpreting the Equal Protection Clause would guarantee for
every generation, regardless of race, that no government entity may
consider race in its decision making. If government line-drawing
takes any form, it logically follows that it should be based on merit
alone.
One asserted weakness of placing too much emphasis on the
text of the Equal Protection Clause, particularly when combined
with traditional methods of statutory construction, is that courts are
expounding a Constitution, not simply a run-of-the-mill statute.
28
Additionally, advocates focusing on a plain meaning rationale are
criticized for ignoring the history and circumstances that sur-
rounded the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 29 There-
fore, even though the textual command appears clear, commenta-
tors urge courts to look to what they conceive to be the drafters'
original intent of the Equal Protection Clause from a more open-
ended perspective.
B. The Original Understanding Approach
Affirmative action advocates often rely on a more open-ended
approach in determining the original intent of the Equal Protection
Clause-the original understanding approach. In resolving the origi-
nal intent of the Equal Protection Clause under the original under-
standing approach, a court would look to the language employed in
light of its meaning when the Clause was enacted.30 In addition,
courts could view the surrounding circumstances that led to its en-
actment. 31 This open-ended approach suggests that a court should
attempt to put itself in the position of the drafters in order to dis-
cern what the drafters intended their words to mean.32 A closer ex-
27. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852-53
(quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("[W]e
must never forget it is a constitution we are expounding.")).
29. See Maltz, supra note 16, at 933.
30. See Paul Brest, Affirmative Action and the Constitution: Three Theories, 72 IowA L.
REv. 281, 282 (1987).
31. See id.
32. See id. ("Picture yourself back in 1868 when the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment
19981
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amination of the original understanding approach illustrates its
shortcomings.
In order to pierce the seemingly impermeable barrier imposed
by the text of the Equal Protection Clause, advocates of affirmative
action point to the context in which the Fourteenth Amendment
was passed. Proponents of affirmative action argue that at the time
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, Congress was involved in
enacting Reconstruction legislation such as the Freedman's Bureau
Act-legislation "conceived of as a massive affirmative action pro-
gram for blacks." 33 The Fourteenth Amendment garnered the sup-
port of the same legislators who favored concurrently enacted race
conscious Reconstruction laws.34 Therefore, the politicians who rati-
fied the Fourteenth Amendment must have understood that it
would permit affirmative action programs for blacks to continue.
The support for Reconstruction programs, however, was far
from unanimous. Similar to the present debate surrounding affirma-
tive action programs, the Reconstruction programs of the time were
repeatedly objected to by politicians who asserted that they were un-
fair to Caucasians. 35 Under the original understanding approach,
however, it must be implied that if the views of those who objected
to Reconstruction legislation had prevailed, there would have been
specific language in the Fourteenth Amendment that addressed
their concerns. Under this line of reasoning, the history surround-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification and the language em-
ployed do not reveal an intent to prohibit affirmative action pro-
was framed and adopted, and ask what its drafters and adopters intended with
respect to reverse discrimination."). For example, in Justice O'Connor's opin-
ion in Croson she noted the following:
The mere recitation of a benign or compensatory purpose for the
use of a racial classification would essentially entitle the States to ex-
ercise the full power of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and insulate any racial classification from judicial scru-
tiny under § 1. We believe that such a result would be contrary to
the intentions of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, who
desired to place clear limits on the States' use of race as a criterion
for legislative action, and to have the federal courts enforce those
limitations.
Livingston, supra note 13, at 176 n.176 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490-91 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
33. Brest, supra note 30, at 282.
34. See Livingston, supra note 13, at 179.
35. See id. at 178.
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grams.36 From this view of history, one could further imply that the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended that affirmative
action programs would not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
37
Advocates of the original understanding approach often bolster
their position by relying on an early interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment by the Court in the Slaughter-House Cases.3 For
example, scholars and commentators such as Judge A. Leon Higgin-
botham, Jr., often quote the Slaughter-House Court for the proposi-
tion that the Fourteenth Amendment addressed "the freedom of
the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom,
and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited domin-
ion over him. ' 39 From this precedent on the heels of the Four-
teenth Amendment's ratification, one could argue that to interpret
the Equal Protection Clause to afford protection to whites would
"turn[] the intent and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment on
its head."4°
However, even these early interpretations of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause made clear that all races, including the Caucasian race,
"may invoke the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against racial
discrimination."' 4' Moreover, scholars have chronicled three differ-
ent strands of the original understanding of the Equal Protection
36. See Brest, supra note 30, at 282; Brody, supra note 13, at 295-98. As one com-
mentator explained:
From the closing days of the Civil War until the end of civilian Re-
construction some five years later, Congress adopted a series of social
welfare programs whose benefits were expressly limited to blacks.
These programs were generally open to all blacks, not only to re-
cently freed slaves, and were adopted over repeatedly expressed ob-
jections that such racially exclusive measures were unfair to whites.
The race-conscious Reconstruction programs were enacted concur-
rently with the fourteenth amendment and were supported by the
same legislators who favored the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. This history strongly suggests that the Framers of the
amendment could not have intended it generally to prohibit affirma-
tive action for blacks or other disadvantaged groups.
Livingston, supra note 13, at 178.
37. See Livingston, supra note 13, at 178.
38. See Entin, supra note 18, at 1192.
39. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with
Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FoRDHAM L. Rxv. 1593, 1645 (1994) (quoting
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 71).
40. Id.
41. Entin, supra note 18, at 1193.
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Clause that evolved through Supreme Court precedent.42 Thus,
pointing to merely one strand of precedent-the Slaughter-House
Cases' Negro Rights Theory-ignores the other lines of judicial
thinking.
43
Although the Slaughter-House Cases may have been one of the
Court's first interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment, it has
not been the last. Notably, in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,44 Justice Powell explained:
The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to
all persons. Its language is explicit .... It is settled beyond
question that the rights created by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the
individual. The rights established are personal rights ...
The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing
when applied to one individual and something else when
applied to a person of another color. If both are not ac-
corded the same protection, then it is not equal.
45
Thus, despite evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment was origi-
nally designed to protect only the freed slaves, it clearly has since
been construed to protect all races.46
Other scholars who favor an original understanding approach
suggest that courts focusing on earlier equal protection precedent
often stray from the original intent of the Clause. 47 For example,
Professor Tribe maintains that the "color-blind" notion initially es-
poused by first Justice Harlan has been misconstrued. 48 Indeed, Pro-
fessor Tribe asserts that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
meant only to prevent "white supremacy" through the Fourteenth
42. See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 1063 (explaining that the "Negro rights theory"
of the Slaughter-House Court was merely the first of three strands of original
understanding jurisprudence employed by the Court).
43. See generally id.
44. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
45. Id. at 289-90 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 220 (1971) ("[T]he Equal Protection
clause was principally designed to protect Negroes against discriminatory ac-
tion by the States.").
46. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90.
47. See TRIBE, supra note 1, § 16-22, at 1525. Professor Tribe asserts that this ap-
proach is much more in keeping with judicial activism and creative constitu-
tionalism. See id. at 1526.
48. See id. at 1524-25.
[Vol. 27
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Amendment.49 However, if one accepts that the sole purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to prevent white supremacy, then one
must also agree that the Fourteenth Amendment would permit any
race to be supreme in the United States provided it is not the white
race. This argument is undoubtedly flawed and has been rejected by
the Court on many occasions.50
An original intent interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
that concludes that its exclusive purpose was to protect freed slaves
produces inconceivable results. Under this type of constitutional in-
terpretation, no Asian-American, Hispanic-American, Native Ameri-
can, or other "protected class" could seek protection under the
Equal Protection Clause." Under an original understanding ap-
proach, a Nigerian who emigrates to this country today would not
have equal protection rights if that Nigerian was not a descendant
of a freed American slave.5 2 Similarly, a Filipino immigrant who set-
tles in this country today would not have equal protection rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment because she too could not trace
her roots to the slavery that historically existed in the United
States. 3 To support this reading of the Equal Protection Clause is
an anathema to the principles of equality; equal protection rights
are individual rights possessed by each person regardless of race.
54
No language could be clearer than, " [n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which . . . den [ies] to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws." 55 It would therefore appear
that as long as European-Americans are defined as persons, they too
have the right to equal protection of the laws.
Other commentators have pointed out the illogical result that
would follow from concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to permit affirmative action today:
To say that Congress, by providing relief to newly freed
slaves, intended to make them and all their descendants
49. See id. at 1525.
50. See Entin, supra note 18, at 1193 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
51. Cf John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Po-
tection Laws", 50 COLUM. L. REv. 131, 167-69 (1950) (concluding that the Four-
teenth Amendment has broad application).
52. See id.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 33, 39-40.
54. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) ("The rights created by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the in-
dividual. The rights established are personal rights.").
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
1998] 405
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(and any other dark-skinned person) a permanently pro-
tected class would be akin to saying that when Congress
votes disaster relief funds for hurricane victims in Florida it
thereby intends to create a class of persons and to endow
that class with permanent protections that exist without re-
gard to the conditions that were the justification for the
legislation.
56
In sum, the only common ground that these competing philos-
ophies share is that none are fully embraced by the present Court.
The splintered decisions rendered by the recent Court led one
scholar to conclude: "We neither obey the plain text of the amend-
ments nor do we claim to be bound by the intent or original under-
standing of the amendments' Framers. '5 7 Accordingly, some com-
56. Lundin, supra note 16, at 451. In recognition of the diverse methods em-
ployed to interpret the Equal Protection Clause, it should be noted that Judge
(then Professor) Posner detailed an economic analysis of the Equal Protection
Clause. See Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Pref-
erential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT. REv. 1. Judge Posner's analy-
sis of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, was not limited solely to econom-
ics. See id. at 21. He recognized that if an interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause was based solely on the intent of the drafters, then whites
would "have no leg to stand on" when their constitutional rights were vio-
lated. See id. (referring to the fact that the Equal Protection Clause was
drafted in the political environment of post-Civil War Reconstruction, when
the plight of the recently freed slaves was the focus of legislators). Judge Pos-
ner reasoned, "[slo bizarre would discrimination against whites in admission
to institutions of higher learning have seemed to the Framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment that we can be confident that they did not consciously
seek to erect a constitutional barrier against such discrimination." Id. at 21-22.
57. Lundin, supra note 16, at 438. For example, although Justice O'Connor has
authored many opinions in affirmative action cases, her philosophical ap-
proach remains unclear. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633-75 (1993); Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602-31 (1990) (O'Connor, J., Rehnquist,
C.J., Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 284-94 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Certainly Justice
O'Connor looks to the intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490-91 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (explaining "that such a result would be contrary to the intentions
of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, who desired to place clear lim-
its on the States' use of a race as a criterion for legislative action, and to have
the federal courts enforce those limitations"). Like many other opinions, how-
ever, Justice O'Connor generally begins from the premise that her opinion is
confined by the Court's precedent. Thus, a thorough analysis of the constitu-
tionality of affirmative action, as intended by the Framers, cannot be located
in any Supreme Court opinion.
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mentators suggest that the original understanding and textual
approaches fail to provide suitable guidance for resolving affirma-
tive action issues.58 Instead, it is suggested that the attention should
focus on " 'the great decisions of the Supreme Court' " such as
Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny.5 9 The next section of
this Comment explores several noteworthy Equal Protection Clause
decisions handed down by the Court.
III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT IN RACED-BASED
CLASSIFICATIONS
Any discussion of modern race-based classifications 60 properly
begins with the Supreme Court's admonition in Hirabayashi v. United
States.6' The Hirabayashi Court stated that "[d]istinctions between
citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality."
62
One year later in Korematsu v. United States,63 the Court elabo-
rated on the approach in Hirabayashi and explained "that all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the
most rigid scrutiny."64
58. See Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action
Debate, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1327, 1335 (1986).
59. Id.
60. Perhaps the most slippery aspect of race-based classifications is that the Judi-
cial Branch of government has not been able to formulate a consistent, unani-
mous constitutional approach to how best remedy this nation's discriminatory
past. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166-67 & n.17 (1987).
While frustrating, it is perhaps fitting because it likely reflects society's struggle
with the issue.
61. 320 U.S. 81, 102 (1943) (holding that a military curfew order imposed on a
natural born citizen of Japanese ancestry, while America was at war with Ja-
pan, was a valid exercise of war power).
62. Id. at 100.
63. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
64. Id. at 216. Thus was born the phrase that eventually became known as the
strict scrutiny test. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-
91 (1978) (holding that all races are protected under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment) (citing Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216). It would appear the phrase, "[t]hat
is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional," Korematsu, 323 U.S.
at 216, was written in recognition of the constitutional escape hatch the Court
used to limit constitutional freedoms during times of war-the war powers
conferred upon Congress and the Executive. See id. at 217. The Korematsu
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In Korematsu, the Court justified the detention of persons of
Japanese descent, following the attack on Pearl Harbor for fear that
they might conspire with the Japanese armed forces in an invasion
of the United States. 65 The rights curtailed in Korematsu involved ex-
clusion orders and curfews imposed upon Japanese-Americans who
resided in areas that the military labeled as vital to national secur-
ity.66 The Supreme Court upheld the orders as constitutional, rea-
soning that they were designed to "protect[] against espionage and
against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense
premises, and national-defense utilities."67 The Court accepted the
government's position that the presence of an undeterminable
number of disloyal Japanese-Americans while the United States was
at war with Japan made the exclusion and curfew orders constitu-
tional.68 The Court noted that it was aware of the hardships such or-
ders would cause, 69 but justified its opinion on the ground that
"hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hard-
ships."70 However, the Court limited its holding when it explained
that "compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their
homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is incon-
Court explained the exception as follows:
Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes,
except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is incon-
sistent with our basic governmental institutions. But when under con-
ditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile
forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the
threatened danger.
Id. at 219-20.
65. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-20. The Korematsu decision has been widely criti-
cized because it justified an extreme form of racial discrimination. See DeFunis
v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 339-40 n.20 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The
Court formulated its opinion in the aftermath of the surprise attack by the
Japanese on Pearl Harbor. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting) (pointing out that
the World War II race-based classifications were the result of an overly pru-
dent military in time of war). The acts taken by our government during this
period "went to the verge of wartime power." Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting). In
retrospect, the detention of Japanese-Americans for fear that they would pro-
vide assistance to the Japanese armed forces in an invasion was clearly exces-
sive. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
66. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215-17.
67. Id. at 217.
68. See id. at 223-24.




sistent with our basic governmental institutions."71
Although the wisdom of the Korematsu Court has been criticized
because it is thought today that the exigent circumstances that the
country faced did not warrant the constitutional restrictions it im-
posed,7" questions still exist as to whether the Equal Protection
Clause protects all Americans.
It would appear that under the limiting principle established in
Korematsu, race-based classifications violate the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments unless Congress declares war and determines that the
nation is faced with the "direst emergency and peril"73 and must
"protect[] against espionage and against sabotage to national-
defense material, national-defense premises, and to national-defense
utilities." 74 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has moved from permit-
71. Id. at 219-20 (emphasis added).
72. See TRiBE, supra note 1, § 16-14, at 1466-67 n.7. Professor Tribe seems to agree
with Justice Murphy's dissent in Korematsu which "found it 'difficult to believe
that reason, logic or experience could be marshaled in support of [the] as-
sumption' on which the exclusion order was based-namely, that 'all persons
of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous tendency to commit sabotage and
espionage.'" Id. (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235). Under this same reason-
ing, perhaps Professor Tribe would support the parallel argument that affirma-
tive action programs that discriminate against all whites on the presumption
that all whites have been afforded privileged backgrounds ought to be
stricken. But see id. at 1521 (asserting that by reading the Constitution to for-
bid color-consciousness in government acts would defeat our nation's effort
"to eradicate racial distinctions from our future").
Professor Tribe explains that even the Korematsu Court distinguished be-
tween "pressing public necessity" and "racial antagonism" when permitting ra-
cial classifications. Id. at 1524 (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216). Professor
Tribe implies that racial classifications are permissible as long as they do not
reflect racial antagonism. See id. Professor Tribe assures his readers that,
"[r]acial antagonism, of course, is hardly the motive of today's minority set-
aside programs." Id. While it is arguable whether racial antagonism is the
present motive of any particular affirmative action program, it is clearly the
collective result of the institution itself. Indeed, minority set-aside programs
create a cycle incapable of accomplishing the very purpose Professor Tribe as-
serts to justify their existence-"to eradicate racial distinctions from our fu-
ture." Id. at 1521.
Notably, Professor Tribe does not attempt to compare the pressing public
necessity of national defense during World War II with the presumed public
necessity of minority set-aside programs. It may be fairly argued that the con-
stitutionality of Korematsu was based on the exigencies of an entire world at
war and that the Court would not have permitted any other racial classifica-
tions short thereof. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220.
73. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220.
74. Id. at 217; cf. id. at 219-20 (applying this standard to the "[c]ompulsory exclu-
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ting racial distinctions in time of war to allowing race-based classifi-
cations for other reasons considerably less exigent.75
A. Supreme Court Precedent in the Past Thirty Years
In order to understand the context of Hopwood v. Texas,76 it is
necessary to review Korematsu's relevant progeny including DeFunis v.
Odegaard,77 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,78 Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education,79 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,80 and
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.81 Although the Supreme Court re-
cently denied certiorari in Hopwood,82 it granted certiorari twenty-two
years earlier in a factually similar case-DeFunis v. Odegaard.8 3
In DeFunis, an applicant to the University of Washington School
of Law (UW), Marco DeFunis, sued the law school on the grounds
that he had been denied admission on the basis of his race.8 4 The
admissions process at UW utilized an index called the "Predicted
First Year Average" (Average)-a formula applied to an applicant's
undergraduate grade point average and Law School Admission Test
(LSAT) score.85 The school then established admissions categories
by which an applicant would be either offered admission, denied
sion of large groups of citizens from their homes"). Whether or not the na-
tion ought to be at war with racism and whether racial inequality creates Kore-
matsu's exigent circumstances is not the subject of this Comment. However, it
is clear that the race-based classifications used today are not established out of
a justifiable fear that without them, the country would become the victim of
espionage or sabotage against our nation's security, as was the case in Kore-
matsu. See id. at 217. Without an exigent justification, any race-based classifica-
tion should fail by analogy under Korematsu. Cf id. at 219-20.
75. Compare Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24, with Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (recognizing that race may be a permissible factor
to consider in a university's admissions process).
76. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
77. 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam).
78. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
79. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion).
80. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
81. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
82. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
83. 416 U.S. 312 (1974). The admissions policies found at the University of Texas
Law School are similar to those at the University of Washington. Compare id. at
321-24 (describing an admissions process where an applicant's grade point av-
erage and LSAT score were combined into a formula and the use of special
committees to evaluate minority applicants), with Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d
932, 935-38 (5th Cir. 1996).
84. See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 314.
85. See id. at 321 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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admission, or held for further review.86 If an applicant's Average was
above a specific number, admission was nearly certain.87 Conversely,
if an applicant's Average was below a specific number, admission
was denied unless other information in the applicant's file existed
that "indicat[ed] greater promise than suggested by the Average."
88
Those applicants whose Average fell between the high and low
range were held for further consideration.
9
DeFunis, whose Average was 76.23, claimed that UW violated
his Fourteenth Amendment rights because the school denied him
admission in favor of thirty-seven minority students with lower Aver-
ages.90 The state trial court granted DeFunis's motion for injunction
and ordered UW to admit DeFunis.91 The Washington Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's order and ruled that UW's admis-
sions policies were constitutional. 92 DeFunis then appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States.
93
The Supreme Court initially granted DeFunis's petition for certi-
orari but subsequently denied further review.94 By the time the case
reached the Supreme Court, DeFunis was in his third year of law
school at UW.95 In response to DeFunis's petition, UW stated that,
regardless of the Supreme Court's decision, DeFunis would be per-
mitted to finish his legal education at UW.96 The Supreme Court
ruled that the case was moot "[b]ecause the petitioner will com-
plete his law school studies at the end of the term for which he has
now registered regardless of any decision this Court might reach on
the merits of this litigation. ' 97 Justice Douglas dissented from the
Court's finding the case moot.98
Justice Douglas's dissent,99 he did not find that UW's use of sep-
86. See id. at 321-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 321-22 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 322 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
89. See id. at 322-23 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 324 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 314-15.
92. See id. at 315 ("Mr. Justice Douglas, as Circuit Justice, stayed the judgment of
the Washington Supreme Court pending the final disposition of the case by
[the DeFunis] Court.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 314-15.
96. See id. at 315-16 n.2.
97. Id. at 319.
98. See id. at 320-48 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
99. See id. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan issued a separate dis-
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arate admissions policies for minorities and whites violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, but he expressed disapproval nonethe-
less. °00 Justice Douglas observed that " [a]pplicants who had indi-
cated on their application forms that they were either black, Chi-
cano, American Indian, or Filipino were treated differently in
several respects."' 0' Regardless of their Average, none could be sum-
marily rejected by the admissions committee's chairman. 0 2 Instead,
black applicants were assigned for review to a first-year black law
student and a professor who worked in a program dealing with dis-
advantaged college students considering law school.'03 Applications
from among the other three minority groups were assigned for re-
view to an assistant dean who was on the admissions Committee.' 4
Minority applicants, although compared against one another for ad-
mission, "were never directly compared to the remaining applica-
tions . . . . Thirty-seven minority applicants were admitted under
this procedure. Of these, thirty-six had Averages below DeFunis' [s]
76.23, and thirty had Averages below 74.5, and thus would ordinarily
have been summarily rejected by the Chairman." 105
Justice Douglas explained that "the consideration of race as a
measure of an applicant's qualification normally introduces a capri-
cious and irrelevant factor working an invidious racial discrimina-
tion. 10 6 Referring to the Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia,10 7 Jus-
tice Douglas stated that " '[t]he clear and central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of
invidious discrimination in the States.' ",108
One marvels at Justice Douglas's foresight, articulating the inev-
itable stigmatizing effects of continued emphasis on race, when he
wrote:
The purpose of the University of Washington cannot be to
produce black lawyers for blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles,
Jewish lawyers for Jews, Irish lawyers for Irish. It should be
senting opinion in the case. See id. at 348 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. See id. at 331-34 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 323 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
102. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
103. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
104. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 323-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 333 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
107. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).




to produce good lawyers for Americans . . . .That is the
point at the heart of all our school desegregation cases,
from Brown v. Board of Education through Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education. A segregated admissions pro-
cess creates suggestions of stigma and caste no less than a
segregated classroom, and in the end it may produce that
result despite its contrary intentions. One other assumption
must be clearly disapproved: that blacks or browns cannot
make it on their individual merit. That is a stamp of inferi-
ority that a State is not permitted to place on any lawyer
. . . .All races can compete fairly at all professional levels.
So far as race is concerned, any state-sponsored preference
to one race over another in that competition is in my view
"invidious" and violative of the Equal Protection Clause.' 9
109. Id. at 342-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239-40 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring); id.
at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 525
(1979) (Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) ("[H]istory contains one clear
lesson. Under our Constitution, the government may never act to the detri-
ment of a person solely because of that person's race.").
Nevertheless, the Court has ruled that race-based remedial measures are
constitutional. In holding that a desegregation plan, which took into account
the race of elementary children did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court explained that "[a]ny other approach would freeze the status quo
that is the very target of all desegregation processes." McDaniel v. Barresi, 402
U.S. 39, 41 (1971) (citing Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971) and Youngblood v. Board of Pub. Inst., 430 F.2d 625, 630 (5th
Cir. 1970)). Furthermore, the Court in North Carolina Board of Education v.
Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971), held that "U]ust as the race of the students must
be considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred,
so also must race be considered in formulating a remedy." Id. at 46.
These desegregation cases are distinguishable from affirmative action pro-
grams used in a school admissions process. McDaniel, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, and
Swann involved situations in which public schools remained segregated,
thereby directly contravening the Court's mandate in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In other words, in refusing to honor the holding in
Brown, the various school boards were violating the Fourteenth Amendment
rights of black school children by resisting desegregation. See generally Swann,
402 U.S. at 45; McDanie 402 U.S. at 41; Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. at 14.
The McDaniel Court correctly noted that it would be impossible to measure
whether schools were desegregating if the race of the students involved could
not be examined. See McDaniel, 402 U.S. at 41. As such, the Court examined
the race of the students in adjudicating their rights. See id.
Similarly, in adjudicating whether the University of Texas School of Law
violated the constitutional rights of white applicants, the Fifth Circuit ex-
amined the race of all of the students applying. See infra note 194-96 and ac-
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To this day, Justice Douglas's position enjoys support of certain
members on the Court.
110
Five years following DeFunis, the Court in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke"' tackled a graduate school's admissions proce-
dures that used race as a factor.112 Bakke, a white student, applied
for admission to the Medical School of the University of California
at Davis (UC Davis) in 1973 and 1974.113 At UC Davis, the admis-
sions program set aside sixteen places for minority candidates in a
class of 100.114 Bakke alleged that "the Medical School's special ad-
missions program operated to exclude him from the school on the
basis of his race, in violation of his rights under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."11 5
In Bakke, the Court announced a majority judgment, but not a
majority opinion, that invalidated the UC Davis program. 16 How-
ever, the Bakke decision is most notable for Justice Powell's opinion
that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review for all
race-based classifications," 7 and that the rights guaranteed in the
companying text. This author submits that Texas cannot, without ignoring the
principles set forth in Korematsu, discriminate on the basis of race. See supra
notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 524 (Stewart
& Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
111. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
112. See id.
113. See id. at 276-77.
114. See id. at 275.
115. Id. at 277-78. Bakke claimed violations under both the Equal Protection
Clause, Article I, Section 21 of the California Constitution, and Title VI, Sec-
tion 601 of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. at 278.
116. See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITuTIONAL LAw § 14.10(b) (1), at
710 (5th ed. 1995).
[A]ll nine Justices vot[ed] on the legality of the Davis program. Four
Justices ... concluded that the Davis program violated Title VI of the
Federal Civil Rights Act. They found that the application of Title VI
to the admissions program made it unnecessary to reach any consti-
tutional issue. Four Justices . . . [concluded] that the Davis program
did not violate either the equal protection clause or Title VI. Thus,
the ruling of the case turned on the vote of Justice Powell, even
though his analysis of the issues was not supported by a majority of
Justices. Justice Powell found that the equal protection clause and,
therefore, Title VI, required invalidation of the Davis program.
Id. at 712-13.
117. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 ("When [classifications] touch upon an individual's
race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the
burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a com-
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Fourteenth Amendment apply to all individuals regardless of race."8
The notion that a Court's level of scrutiny should not change
merely because the affirmative action program affects a race not his-
torically discriminated against was bolstered in Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education."9 The primary issue in Wygant was whether a
school board "may extend preferential protection against layoffs to
some of its employees because of their race or national origin."' 20
In a collective bargaining agreement between a teacher's union and
the Jackson Board of Education, the parties agreed that if teacher
layoffs became necessary, teachers with the most seniority would be
retained.'2 ' The scheme also provided that minority teachers, re-
gardless of seniority, would be retained in the same proportion as
minority personnel employed before the layoff.
122
In determining the constitutionality of the racial classifications,
the Wygant Court applied a strict scrutiny standard of review
23
pelling governmental interest."). For a discussion of other Justices that sup-
port Justice Powell's opinion, see infra note 119.
118. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490-91 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
119. 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (plurality opinion). Justice Powell's opinion was
joined by three Justices: Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice
O'Connor. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 116, § 14.10(b) (2), at 722. Jus-
tice O'Connor concurred in the standard of review, but noted that "the dis-
tinction between a compelling and an important government purpose may be
a negligible one." Id. at 723 (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice White
was the fifth Justice to join in the judgment, although he did not speak to the
issue of the appropriate standard of review. See id. at 723.
120. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 269-70.
121. See id. at 270.
122. See id. at 281-83; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 116, § 14.10(b) (2), at
721. The collective bargaining agreement read, in pertinent part:
In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of
teachers through layoff from employment by the Board, teachers
with the most seniority in the district shall be retained, except that at
no time will there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid
off than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at
the time of the layoff. In no event will the number given notice of
possible layoff be greater than the number of positions to be elimi-
nated. Each teacher so affected will be called back in reverse order
for positions for which he is certificated maintaining the above mi-
nority balance.
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270 (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273-74. For a discussion of the four Justices that joined




through a two-prong test. 12 4 According to the Court, the strict scru-
tiny standard of review meant that "[a]ny preference based on ra-
cial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching ex-
amination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional
guarantees."' 12 5 The first prong of the test required the government
to demonstrate that the racial classification was justified by a com-
pelling government interest. 126 The second prong required the gov-
ernment to demonstrate that the means chosen were narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the compelling government interest.
2
1
The Wygant Court held that the government interests advanced
by the Jackson Board of Education were not compelling.2 1 Specifi-
cally, the Wygant Court rejected the Board's proposed use of socie-
tal discrimination as a constitutional avenue for racial classifica-
tions. 129 Instead of allowing the Board to rely on the "amorphous"
130
phrase "societal discrimination," 3' the Wygant Court demanded that
the specific governmental unit, in this case the Jackson Board of
Education, demonstrate that it had engaged in prior discrimina-
tion. 132 Notably, the Wygant Court viewed the Board's attempt to
remedy past societal discrimination by providing minority role mod-
els for school children as being constitutionally insufficient.
133
In addition, the Wygant Court held that the Board's program
was not narrowly tailored because it imposed an unfair burden on
124. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
125. Id. at 273-74 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980)). This
author disagrees with this bifurcated manner of scrutinizing racial classifica-
tions to the extent that it dilutes the Korematsu Court's requirement that "all
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are im-
mediately suspect." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1945).
While the Korematsu Court may have couched its standard in terms of restric-
tions "which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group," id., there is no
meaningful distinction between government restrictions that explicitly curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group and those that have the effect of cur-
tailing a single racial group's civil rights.
126. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 274-76.
129. See id. at 276.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 276-77.
133. See id. While the Court noted that "[a]s part of this Nation's dedication to
eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be called upon to bear
some of the burden of the remedy," it held that the burden at issue was too
great. Id. at 281-84 (emphasis added).
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the non-minority teachers. 3 4 The Wygant Court distinguished be-
tween "hiring goals" 135 and "layoffs."' 136 The Court explained that a
greater burden could be placed on an innocent party when hiring
is the issue because "[d] enial of a future employment opportunity is
not as intrusive as loss of an existing job.'1 37 The Wygant Court em-
phasized that losing a job was distinguishable because it often re-
sults in severe hardship to an employee who had established senior-
ity and stability in his job.38 The Wygant Court explained that when
one loses his job the result is a "serious disruption of [one's life].
That burden is too intrusive."' 39 The Court concluded by noting
that a less intrusive program to achieve the Board's desired results
could have been aimed at hiring goals instead of a discriminatory
lay-off program. 4°
This Comment suggests that a Wygant method of analysis is un-
necessary hairsplitting at best and haphazard guessing at worst. Had
the Wygant Court recalled the earlier admonitions in Hirabayashi
and Korematsu,'4' it would have alleviated its need to attempt to dis-
cern the difference between denying future employment and losing
an existing job. Instead, Wygant should have adhered to the princi-
ples espoused in Hirabayashi and Korematsu by holding that any em-
ployment decision that considers an individual's race as a factor is
impermissible under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 142 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the constitutionality of a program established by the city of
Richmond that required prime contractors to subcontract at least
thirty percent of their total contract to Minority Business Enter-
prises (MBEs). 143 The city invited contractors to submit bids on a
project to provide and install plumbing fixtures in the city's jail.
144
Croson, the only contractor to submit a bid, made a good faith ef-
fort to find MBE subcontractors in order to meet the city's thirty-
134. See id. at 281-84.
135. Id. at 282.
136. Id. at 282-83.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 283.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 283-84.
141. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
142. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
143. See id. at 477.
144. See id. at 481.
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percent requirement.1 45 Initially, no interested MBE had the means
or credit to be a subcontractor for the project. 46 However, after fur-
ther search Croson was able to locate a qualified MBE, but the MBE
charged substantially more than the price Croson quoted in its over-
all bid for the project.
47
Croson requested that the city allow it to increase the overall
submission price to reflect the higher bid submitted by the MBE
subcontractor. 48 The city refused and elected to rebid the con-
tract. 49 Consequently, Croson sued claiming that the ordinance was
unconstitutional on its face and as applied to its situation.150
In determining whether Richmond's plan was constitutional, a
majority of the Court held strict scrutiny was the appropriate stan-
dard of review in an affirmative action case. I'5 In analyzing the case
under the strict scrutiny standard of review, the Court utilized the
two-prong test set forth in Wygant 52 Richmond attempted to justify
its race-based classification on broad claims of discrimination in the
construction industry in Richmond, the Commonwealth of Virginia,
and across the nation. 53 The Court criticized Richmond's reason-
ing, and held that broad assertions of discrimination across an en-
tire industry or encompassing the whole nation could never be nar-
rowly tailored because they are without a " 'logical stopping
point.' -154 The Court found that "none of the evidence presented
145. See id. at 482.
146. See id. at 482-83.
147. See id. The bid by Continental, the qualified MBE, increased the project cost
by $7,663.16. See id.
148. See id. at 483.
149. See id.
150. See id. Croson raised a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). See id.
151. See id. at 494; see also id. at 551 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Today, for the first
time, a majority of this Court has adopted strict scrutiny as its standard of
Equal Protection Clause review of race-conscious remedial measures."); NOWAK
& ROTUNDA, supra note 116, § 14.10(a) (4), at 704 ("Justice O'Connor's opin-
ion, together with the opinions of concurring Justices, marks the first time
that a majority of the Court agreed that classifications that were designed to
assist members of minority racial groups should be tested under the strict
scrutiny-compelling interest test.").
152. For a discussion of the two-prong test formulated in Wygant, see supra notes
124-27 and accompanying text.
153. See Croson, at 498-500, 504-06.
154. Id. at 498 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986)
(plurality opinion)). "[I]t is almost impossible to assess whether the Rich-
mond Plan is narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination since it is not
linked to identified discrimination in any way." Id. at 507.
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. . . identified discrimination in the Richmond construction
industry." 155
The Croson Court noted that Wygant required the government
to show a compelling interest before employing racial prefer-
ences. 156 The Court ruled that Richmond did not even meet the
compelling interest prong of the Wygant test, because Richmond's
asserted interests were based on broad, sweeping, and ill-founded al-
legations of racial discrimination.'57 The Court further highlighted
the lower court's finding that the racial "set-aside" program seemed
more the result of politics than an attempt at remedying proven5 '
present effects of past discrimination; and as such, struck down
Richmond's program.
59
The most recent Supreme Court case addressing the conflict
between maintaining the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause
and dealing with legitimate race-based classifications is Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena.'60 One of the central issues addressed in
Adarand was the level of scrutiny applicable to race-based programs
promulgated by the federal government.' 61 The Adarand Court ana-
lyzed whether equal protection challenges under the Fifth Amend-
ment should be viewed with less scrutiny than those challenges
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 62 The Court ruled that state
and federal programs discriminating on the basis of race are subject
to the same level of scrutiny.
63
155. Id. at 505.
156. See id. at 485.
157. See id. at 498-503. In rationalizing its remedy, the city of Richmond cited the
exclusion of blacks from trade unions and trade programs, but also noted "a
host of nonracial factors which would seem to face a member of any racial
group." Id. at 498-99.
158. See id. at 485. The Court cited the court of appeals's opinion that found " 'no
record of prior discrimination by the city in awarding public contracts,'" based
on the statistical data and a debate on the subject at a City Council meeting.
Id. (quoting J.A. Croson Co. v. Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1358 (4th Cir.
1987)).
159. See id.
160. 515 U.S. 200, 213-18 (1995).
161. This question appears to have been answered by the Court fifty-one years
before Adarand. In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Court
declared the following: "[A]II legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of
a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to
the most rigid scrutiny." Id. at 216.




Adarand submitted the low bid as a subcontractor for a govern-
ment highway construction contract.'64 The general contractor was
awarded165 more money if it hired a subcontractor that met the
Small Business Administration's (SBA) definition of socially disad-
vantaged. 66 The SBA definition created the presumption that indi-
viduals were socially disadvantaged if they were "Black, Hispanic,
Asian Pacific, Subcontinent Asian, [or] Native Americans . . . [or]
'members of other groups designated from time to time by SBA."'' 167
The Adarand Court noted that the Small Business Act established a
government-wide goal that at least five percent of all contract and
subcontract awards should go to socially and economically disadvan-
taged individuals.
168
The general contractor awarded the subcontract to a "socially
and economically disadvantaged" business even though the lowest
subcontract bid was entered by Adarand, a non-minority as defined
by the SBA. 169 The general contractor's chief estimator submitted an
affidavit stating that the contract would have been awarded to
Adarand but for the fact that the general contractor received more
money by awarding the contract to a socially and economically dis-
advantaged business. 170 Adarand argued that this socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged presumption "discriminated on the basis of
race in violation of the Federal Government's Fifth Amendment ob-
ligation not to deny anyone equal protection of the laws."' 7' The
Supreme Court, while not addressing whether the Government sub-
contractor compensation program violated the Equal Protection
164. See id. at 205.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 205-07 (citing 13 C.F.R. § 124.105(b) (1) (1970)).
167. Id. at 207.
168. See id. at 206. This five percent rule seemingly establishes a quota. Justice Pow-
ell suggested the ambiguity of the terms "goal" and "quota" when he de-
scribed the admissions program at UC Davis in Bakke.
The special admissions program is undeniably a classification based
on race and ethnic background .... Whether this limitation is de-
scribed as a quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of race
and ethnic status .... The guarantee of equal protection cannot
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else
when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded
the same protection, then it is not equal.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978).
169. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. See id.
171. Id. at 205-06.
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Clause, remanded the case to the lower courts to determine
whether the program would survive strict scrutiny.
172
The preceding summary of the major cases decided by the
Court provides the backdrop for the issue before the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas.173 In light of the prin-
ciple of stare decisis, the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Hopwood is well
reasoned. Supreme Court precedent such as Hirabayashi's warning
that using race as a deciding factor is odious to a free society;
74
Korematsu's intimation that race-based classifications can survive
strict scrutiny only in times of war while the country fears espionage
and sabotage; 175 Bakke's recognition that whites are protected under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;176 Wy-
gant's two-prong test used to apply a strict scrutiny standard of re-
view, and its rejection of societal discrimination as a legitimate pur-
pose for race-based classifications; 7 7 Croson's rejection that local
affirmative action programs can be justified through evidence of na-
tionwide discrimination; 7 8 and Adarand's holding that federal
programs that distinguish people depending on their race are sub-
ject to strict scrutiny, 79 illustrate the solid ground upon which Hop-
wood stands.8 0
IV. THE FACTS AND THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS OF
HOPWOOD
In order to be considered constitutional, a race-based classifica-
tion must pursue a compelling government interest and be narrowly
tailored in pursuit of that interest.'8' The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the University of Texas School
of Law's (UT) admissions practices were unconstitutional because
UT failed to present a compelling government interest that justified
the practices adopted.
182
172. See id. at 239.
173. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
174. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 105 (1943).
175. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944).
176. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-91 (1978).
177. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (plurality opin-
ion).
178. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-503 (1989) (plural-
ity opinion).
179. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 206-08 (1995).
180. See supra notes 61-172 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.




After being denied admission to UT, Cheryl J. Hopwood, Doug-
las W. Chervil, Kenneth R. Elliot, and David A. Rogers sued the
State of Texas 83 for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42
U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.184 After examining the pertinent facts, the district court
opinion, 185 and the pertinent case law, the Fifth Circuit determined
that UT presented "no compelling justification, under [the Equal
Protection Clause of] the Fourteenth Amendment or Supreme
Court precedent, that [could] allow[] it to continue to elevate some
races over others, even for the wholesome purpose of correcting [a]
perceived racial imbalance in the student body."'
' 86
Competition for admission into UT was intense. 87 Therefore,
UT established the Texas Index (TI), which the school used to eval-
uate an applicant's undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and
Law School Admission Test (LSAT) score. 8 First, UT would enter
an applicant's GPA and LSAT score into a formula and arrive at a
TI score. 89 This TI score would then be used to rank applicants. 190
183. Other defendants included the University of Texas Board of Regents, mem-
bers of the Board, the University of Texas School of Law, the President of the
University, the dean of the law school, and the Chairman of the Admissions
Committee, all in their official capacity. See id. at 938 n.13.
184. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 553 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
185. See id. The district court ruled in favor of UT. See id. at 554.
186. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 934. The Fifth Circuit ruling did not preclude the possibil-
ity of a compelling justification for the use of race-based classifications. It only
held that Texas's race-based admissions program was not justified under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
187. See id. at 935.
188. See id. The LSAT's effectiveness in predicting an applicant's success in law
school has been called into question by Supreme Court Justice Douglas. In his
dissent in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam), Justice Doug-
las cogently noted:
The test purports to predict how successful the applicant will be in
his first year of law school, and consists of a few hours' worth of mul-
tiple-choice questions. But the answers the student can give to a mul-
tiple-choice question are limited by the creativity and intelligence of
the test-maker; the student with a better or more original under-
standing of the problem than the test-maker may realize that none of
the alternative answers are any good, but there is no way for him to
demonstrate his understanding.
Id. at 328 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
189. See Hopwood, 78 E3d at 935 n.1.
190. See id. at 935. The TI score was also used to predict the applicant's probability
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If an applicant's TI score was above a certain number, the applicant
was placed in the "presumptive admit" category.191 If an applicant's
TI score was below a certain number, the applicant was placed in
the "presumptive deny" category. 92 The law school placed a great
deal of weight on an applicants TI score in its admission
decisions. 193
Based on the applicant's race, UT established different ranges
of scores that could qualify a particular candidate for the presump-
tive admit or deny status.1 94 Notably, the minority applicants 95 were
reviewed under a lower TI requirement than other applicants so
that UT could admit more minorities. 196 For example, the presump-
tive denial TI score for whites was a 192 or lower.197 The presump-
tive denial TI score for minorities was 179 or lower. 198 The Fifth Cir-
cuit explained one consequence of these differences in the TI cut-
off scores as follows:
These disparate standards greatly affected a candidate's
chance of admission. For example, by March 1992, because
the presumptive denial score for whites was a TI of 192 or
lower, and the presumptive admit TI for minorities was 189
or higher, a minority candidate with a TI of 189 or above
almost certainly would be admitted, even though his score
was considerably below the level at which a white candidate
of success in law school. See id.
191. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
192. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
193. See id. After ranking applicants based on their TI score, UT "could consider
an applicant's background, life experiences, and outlook." Id. at 935 (noting
that "these hard-to-qualify factors were especially significant for marginal can-
didates").
194. See id. at 936.
195. The court of appeals indicated that, for the sake of simplicity, the word "mi-
norities" meant Mexican Americans and black Americans and the use of the
word "whites" meant white Texas residents and non-preferred minorities. Id. at
936 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted). This Comment uses the term "mi-
nority" to refer to black and Mexican Americans, consistent with the Hopwood
court's decision.
196. See id. The purpose behind admitting more minorities was detailed by the dis-
trict court. See generally Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 554-57 (W.D. Tex.
1994). The district court noted that affirmative action embraces the reasoning
that the removal of barriers does not "suddenly make minority individuals
equal and able to avail themselves of all opportunities." Id. at 554.




almost certainly would be rejected.199
Candidates who were neither presumptively admitted nor de-
nied were placed in a discretionary zone and received further scru-
tiny.2°° All candidates falling in the discretionary zone received con-
siderably more attention than those in the presumptive admit or
deny categories.20 ' However, minority applicants could fall into the
discretionary zone with lower scores than their non-minority coun-
terparts.202 Moreover, minority candidates in the discretionary zone
were treated more favorably than non-minority applicants.
20 3
Non-minority applicants in the discretionary zone were assigned
to a subcommittee composed of three members of the full admis-
sions committee. 204 Each subcommittee would review approximately
thirty applicants. 25 Each subcommittee member could cast between
nine and eleven votes in favor of the applicants that they selected
for admission.20 6 Subject to the chairman's veto, if an applicant re-
ceived two or three votes, an offer of admission would be made.
207 If
199. Id. at 937 (emphasis added). The 1992 entering class at UT consisted of forty-
one African Americans and fifty-five Mexican Americans. See Hopwood, 861 F.
Supp. at 574 n.67. The district court in Hopwood noted that if 1992 admissions
were based only on TIs, no more than nine African Americans and eighteen
Mexican Americans would have been admitted to UT in 1992 on merit alone.
See id. at 571. Thus, when one considers the nine African-Americans and eigh-
teen Mexican-Americans that would have been admitted irrespective of UT's
affirmative action program, Justice Thomas's caveat in Adarand becomes in-
creasingly personified. Justice Thomas poignantly warned:
[S]uch programs engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively,
provoke resentment among those who believe that they have been
wronged by the government's use of race. These programs stamp mi-
norities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop
dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are "entitled" to
preferences.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1994) (Thomas, J., con-
curring).
200. See Hopwood, 78 F.2d at 935-36. Applicants in the presumptive admit category
could be downgraded to the discretionary zone if it was determined that they
possessed a degree in a noncompetitive major or had an inferior undergradu-
ate education. See id. at 936.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 937.
204. See id. at 936.





only one vote was cast, the applicant would be placed on a waiting
list. 20 8 If a candidate received no votes, the application was
denied.
209
In order* to facilitate the evaluation of minority applicants in
the discretionary zone, a minority subcommittee was formed to eval-
uate and discuss every minority candidate.210 The minority subcom-
mittee consisted of the same number of members, however, the mi-
nority subcommittee "could meet and discuss every minority
candidate."21' Thus, every minority candidate falling in the discre-
tionary range received "extensive review and discussion. ' 212 Addi-
tionally, even though the minority subcommittee reported summa-
ries to the admissions committee, "the minority subcommittee's
decisions were " 'virtually final.' "213
The third difference noted by the Fifth Circuit was that non-
minority and minority candidates were placed on separate waiting
lists. 214 The Fifth Circuit explained that the minority waiting list nec-
essarily consisted of minority students that had marginal qualifica-
tions, who were nonetheless acceptable to the law school if space
permitted.215 Under these policies, UT could reject a white appli-
cant with the same TI score as a minority applicant placed on the
waiting list.216 The "segregated" waiting lists were designed to help
"the law school maintain a pool of ... minority candidates." 21 7
In 1992, as a result of the disparate standards, white residents
218
208. See id.
209. See id. at 936.
210. See id. at 937.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 937. Although the court did not indicate specifically, it can be implied
that African-American and Mexican-American students in the discretionary
zone had their applications reviewed by the three committee members meet-
ing as a group, with each individual application receiving the attention of the
entire committee at once. It appears that the committee members reviewing
the applications of non-minorities in the discretionary zone viewed the appli-
cations separate from other committee members, and later reported their
votes to the entire committee.
213. Id. Non-minority applicants receiving two votes from a subcommittee were still
subject to the committee chairman's veto. See id. at 936.
214. See id. at 938.
215. See id. The record is not clear about how UT compared minority and non-
minority students on the waiting list when spaces became available. See id. at
938 n.ll.
216. See id. at 937.
217. Id. at 938.
218. The applicant's residency status also played a material role in the admissions
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admitted to the law school had a mean GPA of 3.53 and an LSAT of
164, whereas the mean scores for Mexican-Americans were 3.27 and
158, and the mean scores for African-Americans were 3.25 and
157.219 The court of appeals made note of Hopwood's assertion that
"600-700 higher scoring white residents were passed over before the
first blacks were denied admission." 220 In sum, a UT applicant's ob-
jective qualifications were viewed by the admissions board in mark-
edly different light depending upon the applicant's race. Accord-
ingly, the Fifth Circuit found UT's race-based admissions policy for
achieving a diverse student body and remedying the present effects
of past discrimination unconstitutional.
221
B. Legal Analysis
An analysis of the Hopwood court's rationale must begin by rec-
ognizing that the "central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
'is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between
individuals on the basis of race."' 222 The Fifth Circuit properly noted
that any constitutional examination of a federal or state program
"that expressly distinguishes between persons on the basis of race"
must be strictly scrutinized. 223 In other words, a government pro-
gram relying upon race as a factor must satisfy the two-pronged test
developed by the Wygant Court.224 First, there must be a compelling
process. See id. at 935 n.2. The circuit court stated:
Under Texas law in 1992, the law school was limited to a class of 15%
non-residents, and the Board of Regents required an entering class
of at least 500 students. The law school therefore had to monitor of-
fers to non-residents carefully, in order not to exceed this quota,
while at the same time maintaining an entering class of a managea-
ble size.
Id.
219. See id. at 936.
220. Id. at 937 n.9. The Fifth Circuit did not make a specific finding, nor did it
rely on this statistic in making its decision, but noted that UT did not appear
to refute it. See id.
221. See id. at 962.
222. Id. at 939 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993)). Additionally, the
Fifth Circuit noted that the Fourteenth Amendment's ultimate purpose is to
"render the issue of race irrelevant in governmental decisionmaking." Id. at
940 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).
223. Id. at 940 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995)
(holding that whenever the government makes racial distinctions, the Consti-
tution requires the most exacting scrutiny)); see also supra notes 123-25 and ac-
companying text.
224. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224, 235); see also supra
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government interest served. 225 Second, the program must be nar-
rowly tailored to fulfill that government interest.
226
The Hopwood court addressed the two compelling government
interests that the lower court found to justify UT's admissions pro-
cess.227 The first interest examined by the Fifth Circuit was the lower
court's finding that "in the context of the law school's admissions
process, obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a racially
and ethnically diverse student body remains a sufficiently compel-
ling interest to support the use of racial classifications. '12 8 The Fifth
Circuit explicitly rejected this holding as "reversibly flawed."2 29 The
Hopwood court held that "the use of race to achieve a diverse stu-
dent body" in higher education could never be a compelling gov-
ernment interest that would overcome the steep standard mandated
by strict scrutiny.230 Second, the lower court found strong evidence
of the present effects of past discrimination at UT and held that
"the remedial purpose of the law school's affirmative action pro-
gram was a compelling governmental objective. ' 231 However, the
Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court because it found that UT
"failed to show a compelling state interest in remedying the present
effects of past discrimination sufficient to maintain the use of race
in its admissions system."
232
notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
225. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940; see also supra note 126 and accompanying text.
226. See Hopwood, 78 F3d at 940; see also supra note 127 and accompanying text.
227. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938 (citing Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 571
(W.D. Tex. 1994)).
228. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 571. This finding by the district court was heavily
criticized by the circuit court. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948. First, in finding di-
versity a compelling government interest, the district court relied on the testi-
mony of "deans from law schools across the country and the testimony of for-
mer and current law students." Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 571 (citations to the
trial record omitted). While the opinions of law school deans certainly have
their place, they are hardly the steel from which a compelling government in-
terest should be forged. To bolster its holding, the district court placed great
emphasis on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke that diversity serves a compel-
ling government interest; an opinion joined by no other Justice. See infra notes
233-38 and accompanying text.
229. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948.
230. Id. at 948 & n.36.
231. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 573.
232. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 955.
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1. Compelling Government Interest Based on Diversity
Defining diversity in higher education as a compelling govern-
ment interest originated in Justice Powell's separate opinion in
Bakke.233 The district court relied heavily on Justice Powell's conclu-
sion that better education flows from diversity.134 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit forcefully rejected Justice
Powell's diversity rationale espoused in Bakke.235 The court of ap-
peals noted that, since the Bakke decision, the Supreme Court "has
accepted the diversity rationale only once in its cases dealing with
race."2 36 The Fifth Circuit declined to follow Justice Powell's opinion
that diversity is a compelling state interest that justifies race-based
affirmative action programs in higher education. 237 The court's pri-
mary reason for rejecting that proposition was that no other Justice
joined Justice Powell's opinion. 238 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that other Supreme Court precedent suggested that diversity
should not be considered. 239 The Fifth Circuit stated that 'Justice
Powell's argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has
never represented the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or
any other case .... Justice Powell's view in Bakke is not binding pre-
cedent on this issue." 240 As such, the Fifth Circuit decided that the
district court erred when it held that diversity was a compelling gov-
ernmental interest.
24'
The Fifth Circuit also rejected diversity as a compelling govern-
ment interest because, in the arena of higher education, diversity
may effectively counter its own intended results. 242 The Fifth Circuit
noted that:
233. See id. at 941; see also supra note 117 and accompanying text.
234. See id. (citing Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 571).
235. See id. at 944-46.
236. Id. at 944 (citing and discussing Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990),
as the only other case accepting diversity as a compelling state interest).
237. See id.; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12
(1978) ("[Diversity] clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institu-
tion of higher education.").
238. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
239. See id. at 945 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240-41
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 612 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(plurality opinion)).
240. Id. at 944.
241. See id. at 948.
242. See id. at 945.
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Within the general principles of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the use of race in admissions for diversity in higher
education contradicts, rather than furthers, the aims of
equal protection. Diversity fosters, rather than minimizes
the use of race. It treats minorities as a group, rather than
as individuals. It may further remedial purposes but, just as
likely, may promote improper racial stereotypes, thus fuel-
ing racial hostility.
2 43
The Hopwood Court highlighted the fact that even if diversity
was a compelling government interest, UT did not further that in-
terest through its admission program. The preferential treatment in-
herent in UT's admissions process only extended to African-
Americans and Mexican-Americans. 244 Preferential treatment was not
granted to members of other races or national origins. Thus UT's
unstated argument that diversity was reached once the proportion-
ate number of African-Americans, Mexican-Americans, and Euro-
pean-American males were enrolled was an obviously irrational
conclusion.
245
2. Remedial Purpose Must be Limited to the Specific State Actor
The Fifth Circuit explained that before a racial classification
could be permitted to remedy past discrimination, there must be
"'some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit
involved.' "246 The Fifth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court previ-
ously rejected generalized assertions of past societal discrimina-
tion.247 Instead, remedial state action must be "limited to the harm
243. Id. Several commentators have asserted just the opposite--diversity can be a
compelling government interest. See Andy Portinga, Racial Diversity as a Compel-
ling Government Interest, 75 U. DET. MERcY L. REv. 73 (1997) (supporting diver-
sity as a compelling government interest in limited circumstances, including
higher education); Robert A. Lauer, Recent Development, Hopwood v. Texas:
A Victory for "Equality" that Denies Reality, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 109 (1996) (assert-
ing that diversity is a compelling government interest in the realm of higher
education); Emily V. Pastorius, Note, The Erosion of Affirmative Action: The Fifth
Circuit Contradicts the Supreme Court on the Issue of Diversity, 27 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REv. 459 (1997) (proposing that the Fifth Circuit's rejection of diversity as a
compelling government interest was "hasty").
244. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936 n.4.
245. See id. at 945.
246. Id. at 949 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1985)
(plurality opinion)).
247. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 950; see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 498 (1989) (plurality opinion); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
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caused by [the] specific state actor. ' 248 The defendants at the dis-
trict level successfully argued that the entire State of Texas was the
state actor that discriminated in the past.249 The Fifth Circuit dis-
agreed.2 50 The Fifth Circuit ruled that by defining the state actor as
the whole State of Texas, the district court violated the Supreme
Court's admonition that remedial programs must be carefully lim-
ited.251 Thus, the Hopwood Court aptly recognized that the Constitu-
tion will only permit a much narrower definition of state actor.25
2
In addition, the district court erroneously expanded the scope
of evidence of racial discrimination by considering evidence of dis-
crimination in Texas's primary and secondary schools. 253 The Fifth
Circuit, relying in part on Korematsu,2 5 4 held that UT had no way to
measure the present effects of past discrimination in Texas's pri-
mary and secondary schools.25 5 Being unmeasurable, any remedy
based on this type of perceived discrimination knew no bounds and
was therefore held unconstitutional.
2 56
3. Remedying the Present Effects of Past Discrimination
In Hopwood, the lower district court held that the remedial pur-
pose of the law school's affirmative action program was a compel-
ling government interest.25 7 The evidence presented to the district
court demonstrated that one of the reasons UT adopted its affirma-
tive action program was to remedy a history of past discrimina-
tion.258 The district court explained that the present effects of past
discrimination were established by the following: "the law school's
248. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 950.
249. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 572-73 (W.D. Tex. 1994). However, it
should be noted that "defendants concede[d] and the district court found,
there [was] no recent history of overt sanctioned discrimination at the Univer-
sity of Texas." Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 951 n.44.
250. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 951.
251. See id. at 950.
252. See id. at 949-5 1.
253. See id. at 950.
254. See id. at 945 n.26.
255. See id. at 951.
256. See id. The Fifth Circuit did not turn a blind eye to Texas's past. The court
merely found UT's broad remedy unconstitutional under strict scrutiny. See id.
at 949-51. In referring to Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), the court noted
that UT did have a discriminatory past, however, it determined that the dis-
crimination no longer existed. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953.
257. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 573 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
258. See id. at 572.
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lingering reputation in the minority community, particularly with
prospective students, as a 'white' school; an underrepresentation of
minorities in the student body; and some perception that the law
school is a hostile environment for minorities."
259
The Fifth Circuit noted that in order to prove present effects of
past discrimination, "the party seeking to implement the program
must, at a minimum, prove that the effect it proffers was caused by
the past discrimination and that the effect is of sufficient magnitude
to justify the program." 26° Employing the Fourth Circuit's rationale
in Podberesky v. Kirwan,261 the Fifth Circuit ruled that the district
court erred when it determined that a "lingering reputation" and a
"hostile environment" were present effects of past discrimination
worthy of a constitutional remedy.262 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit
quoted Podberesky as standing for the proposition that " 'mere knowl-
edge of historical fact is not the kind of present effect that can jus-
tify a race-exclusive remedy. If it were otherwise, as long as there
are people who have access to history books, there will be programs
such as this.' "263
Finally, the Fifth Circuit addressed the claim that minorities
were underrepresented in the law school because of past discrimina-
tion.264 The law school claimed that this underrepresentation was
caused by discrimination in Texas's primary and secondary schools
and thus gave rise to a compelling government interest that was
constitutionally repressible.2 65 However, the Fifth Circuit noted that
under Croson, the redress must be limited to the state actor who
committed the discriminatory acts. 266 As such, the fact that Texas's
primary and secondary schools had committed acts of past discrimi-
nation did not justify UT's race-based classifications today.
267
259. Id.
260. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952 (quoting Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 153 (4th
Cir. 1994)).
261. 38 F.3d 147.
262. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952. In Podberesky, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that a bad
reputation was linked solely to the university's past policies, not to its present
policies. See id. at 952 (citing Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 154).
263. Id. at 952-53 (quoting Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 154).
264. See id. at 953.
265. See id. at 953-54.





V. AFFIRMING EQUALITY IN THE CONSTITUTION
Race should play no role in law school admissions. Despite the
lingering effects of past discrimination, racial equality cannot be
achieved as long as the government continues to justify the use of
race-based classifications for implementing amorphous, inconsistent
programs which purportedly promote racial harmony. 68 Today, no
racial classification should be constitutional unless a situation exists
that equals the exigent circumstances encountered by this nation
during World War II, when Korematsu v. United State269 was decided.
In Korematsu, the Court held that government sponsored racial
distinctions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
must be subject to the "most rigid scrutiny."270 The Korematsu Court
upheld the government's use of racial distinctions based on a num-
ber of factors, most importantly the fact that the world was at war.
The United States had recently been attacked at Pearl Harbor, and
it feared that espionage and the sabotage of the country's war-
making capabilities could threaten the nation's very existence. 27'
Whether those facts stand the test of history's hindsight is not rele-
vant to the current constitutional inquiry. The central idea that
courts should borrow from Korematsu is that these exigent circum-
stances are not present today and certainly were not in Hopwood v.
Texas. 272 If the Constitution permits any exceptions, absent the most
perilous circumstances, then it no longer provides a meaningful
guarantee of equal protection under the law.
The conditions present at the University of Texas in 1996 pale
in comparison to the circumstances that purportedly justified the ra-
268. But see Lauer, supra note 243, at 138-45.
269. 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944) (allowing racial distinctions based on the burden
of war and need to protect against dangers of espionage).
270. Id. at 216.
271. See id. at 217. Having widely discredited the government's detention of people
based on race in the name of public necessity in time of war, incredibly, it is
now permissible to deny equal protection rights to European Americans
under the same flag in time of peace. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,
33940 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Instead of public necessity due to war,
the new euphemistic banner for government-sponsored racial discrimination is
"remedying the present effects of past discrimination." Paradise, 480 U.S. at
180-82. While the new phrase may be politically correct, its underlying policy
is constitutionally contemptible and odious to a free society. See Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).




cial classifications during World War 11.273 The circumstances when
the government has a compelling interest to make racial distinc-
tions has mutated from a world at war, in which our very existence
is threatened, to a law school's admission process.
274
There is no doubt that America has taken dramatic steps to im-
prove racial equality in the past forty years.275 Nevertheless, there is
considerable dispute as to how much progress our country has
made in improving race relations. Judge Higginbotham explained:
While white America apparently approves of African-Ameri-
cans serving in entertainment roles, such as basketball play-
ers Michael Jordan at the University of North Carolina and
Grant Hill at Duke, anxiety appears to rise when avenues
open for African-Americans to attain significant political
power and to determine the public policy rather than the
entertainment policy of this nation.
27 6
However, one cannot ignore the fact that many African and
Carribean-Americans have achieved positions of power in this na-
tion. Widespread encouragement for retired General Colin L. Pow-
ell to seek the 1996 Republican nomination for the U.S. presidency,
arguably the most significant political office in the world, is but one
example of how far this nation has come. 277 Equally remarkable is
that thirty-six years ago a young man named Robert Mack Bell was
arrested and convicted of trespass for sitting at a whites-only restau-
rant.278 In 1997, the Honorable Robert M. Bell was appointed as the
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the state's highest
273. See id.
274. If race is to be used as a benefitting factor in admissions decisions, the only
people who can arguably benefit from affirmative action are those who are as
qualified or less qualified than non-minority applicants. Logic dictates that if a
minority applicant is equally or more qualified than a non-minority applicant
and is admitted without consideration given to race, then the program confers
no benefit on the minority. Thus, by definition, an affirmative action program
can only work when it gives an advantage, based on the immutable character-
istic of race, to someone equally or less qualified. When the minority appli-
cant is equally or less qualified and is admitted because of his race, then the
non-minority's expectation to be treated equally under the law is violated.
This was the circumstance in Hopwood, and can only be seen as a violation of
equal protection.
275. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR, supra note 1, at ix.
276. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., supra note 39, at 1647.
277. See John F. Stacks, The Colin Powell Factor, TIME, July 10, 1995, at 1.
278. See generally Bell v. Maryland, 227 Md. 302, 176 A.2d 771 (1961).
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court. Indeed, General Powell's rise to the highest ranking military
officer of the most powerful military force in our world's history,
and Chief Judge Bell's rise to the highest judicial office in Maryland
suggest that America's egalitarian promises of the eighteenth cen-
tury are fulfilled.
The question remains, should the Equal Protection Clause ap-
ply on a case-by-case basis, or should our Constitution reflect a time-
less, universal principle of equality under the law?279 The cycle of
permissive race-based distinctions sanctioned by government must
cease if the Constitution is ever to become a document truly for the
ages. Absent the most exigent circumstances, the Equal Protection
Clause should be interpreted so as to refuse to embrace the histori-
cal argument that there are times when the government is allowed
to discriminate based on race.
20
It has been argued that race-based remedies do not encourage
polarization but that they are actually necessary to prevent further
polarization of the nation.281 This argument fails to acknowledge
279. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239-40 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); id. at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (holding that the rights guaranteed under the Four-
teenth Amendment are "personal rights" guaranteed to individuals).
280. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
281. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., supra note 39, at 1605. Judge Higginbot-
ham, discussing the ramifications of the 1993 Shaw v. Reno Supreme Court de-
cision, noted: "The Shaw majority's concern that minority-majority districts will
polarize the nation and work to the detriment of African-Americans is un-
founded." Id. To bolster the point, Judge Higginbotham stated, "[i]n congres-
sional districts throughout America, white congressmen represent the majority
of African-Americans without unduly polarizing the nation." Id. One could ar-
gue, however, that polarization arises when a congressional district is specifi-
cally drawn on racial lines, regardless of who benefits. Arguably, the polariza-
tion is recycled when admission to a law school is denied to an applicant
because of the applicant's race. The polarization arises when the government
abdicates the promise of the Equal Protection Clause by tolerating race-based
classifications.
At its heart, the argument for respondents in Shaw v. Reno and for Texas
in Hopwood is that the Constitution, when certain factors are present, permits
racial discrimination; the deciding factor is who the victim of the program or
law might be. This position was further set forth by Judge Higginbotham
when he stated, "[b]ut what sets lawful classifications apart from outright dis-
crimination is the fact that discrimination injures those adversely classified."
Id. at 1602. Judge Higginbotham's argument is not conclusive, but based on
one constitutional construction of the Equal Protection Clause. See A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal Judi-
cial Colleague, 140 U. Pk L. REv. 1005, 1010 & n.16 (1992) (discussing the Con-
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that some racial classifications have the very real effect of punishing
those who have not committed any act of discrimination, thereby
furthering, not diminishing, polarization. This is viewed by affirma-
tive action proponents as a justifiable cost, not a punishment.282 It
has been specifically argued that:
[T] here are simply no alternative means of remedying the
severe inequities suffered by certain minorities. And when
balancing the competing equities, many would argue that
despite the apparent unfairness to the rejected [non-minori-
ties], the moral claims of the victimized minorities for repa-
rations are more substantial .... [W]hether or not the [non-
minorities] have themselves participated in acts of discrimi-
nation, they have been the beneficiaries-conscious or uncon-
scious-of a fundamentally racist society. They thus may be
held independently "liable" to suppressed minorities for a
form of unjust enrichment.
283
Otherwise put, whites who were not alive during this nation's
era of legalized racism, have received benefits because of acts their
ancestors may or may not have committed. Therefore, the govern-
ment has the moral authority to legally violate the rights of whites
because of these past, albeit sometimes fictional, benefits conferred
upon them.28 4 It is difficult to imagine a better recipe for
stitution's level of ambiguity which enables the Court to fill in the interstitial
gaps) (citing BENJAMIN CARDozo, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921)).
A plain meaning approach to the Equal Protection Clause recognizes no
distinctions between lawful and unlawful racial classifications; both are forbid-
den absent the most exigent circumstances. See U.S. CONsT. amends. V & XIV,
§ 1; see also supra note 71 and accompanying text.
282. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that
"a decision by representatives of the majority to discriminate against the mem-
bers of a minority race is fundamentally different from those same representa-
tives' decision to impose incidental costs on the majority of their constituents
in order to provide a benefit to a disadvantaged minority." Id. The only mate-
rial difference between the two, however, is the race of the individual being
discriminated against. Moreover, it is doubtful that Cheryl Hopwood, or any
other applicant, would characterize a denial letter from UT as "incidental."
But see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980) (finding that the
"[f]ailure of non-minority firms to receive certain contracts is, of course, an
incidental consequence of the program").
283. Martin H. Redish, Preferential Law School Admissions and the Equal Protection
Clause: An Analysis of the Competing Arguments, 22 UCLA L. REv. 343, 389 (1974)
(emphasis added).




Furthermore, the argument that "moral claims" trump constitu-
tional rights is at odds with the Constitution. The suggestion that
moral claims should be accorded more weight than constitutional
rights is a dangerous proposition. The protections that the Constitu-
tion guarantees cannot be given or taken away based on the "moral-
ity" of the government or the individual.285 Regardless of the moral
claims of any group, a person's right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment should not be diminished or enhanced be-
cause of his skin color.
Professor Tribe asserts, however, that "it is not a decisive objec-
tion to a voluntarily adopted racial preference favoring non-whites
that some or even all of the white individuals disfavored by it have
themselves been guilty of no discriminatory act. 286 Professor Tribe's
willingness to let the Cheryl Hopwoods of the world shoulder the
burden of history's prejudices is curious. One wonders how Profes-
sor Tribe would react were he denied his position as the Ralph S.
Tyler, Jr., Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School,
not shown to have violated anti-discrimination laws, it could be forced to
award contracts to minority businesses). But see Posner, supra note 56, at 16
n.32. Judge Posner addressed the "benefits" DeFunis had received because he
was a white male:
One could spend many profitless hours discussing whether DeFunis
is better or worse off as the result of the history of racial discrimina-
tion in this country. Perhaps he is better off because, but for a his-
tory of discrimination, there would be a larger pool of qualified
black applicants for a law school education. Perhaps he is worse off
because, but for the history of discrimination, fewer blacks ... would
be interested in becoming lawyers.
Id. at 16 n.32. See generally Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Improving the Economic Status of
Negroes Through Laws Against Discrimination: A Reply to Professor Sovern, 34 U.
CHI. L. REv. 817 (1967). Professor Winter opined:
Jn any event, preferential programs are fundamentally countereduca-
tive on the basic issue of racial discrimination itself. Instead of help-
ing to eliminate race from politics, they inject it. Instead of teaching
tolerance and helping those forces seeking accommodation, they di-
vide on a racial basis. Such programs tend to legitimate the back-lash
by providing it with much of the philosophical and moral base from
which the civil rights movement itself began. And, indeed, there is
no reason to believe that if racial issues become more, rather than
less, of a political issue, Negroes will be the winners.
Id. at 854.
285. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (upholding the First Amend-
ment rights of members of the Ku Klux Klan).
286. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 16-22, at 1522.
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under some voluntarily adopted racial preference favoring non-
whites. One might also wonder whether Professor Tribe would view
this denial as being "incidental."
287
VI. CONCLUSION
We jeopardize the strides that have been made towards equal
rights when we punish selected innocent Americans with govern-
ment sponsored discrimination. Today, instead of in the name of ra-
cial superiority, rights are trampled in the name of a "compelling
government interest" or "narrowly tailored program," or some
other politically neutral term for racial discrimination.
Is there any sense or productive value in implementing arbi-
trary decisions regarding who should benefit and who should bear
the burden of race-based classifications? Should the Norwegian, Bos-
nian, Polish, Lebanese, Syrian, Israeli, Iranian, Libyan, or Swedish
citizens emigrating to the United States today be treated as a non-
minority whose rights may be dismissed under the Constitution be-
cause they have benefitted, consciously or otherwise, from events
that took place in the United States long before they arrived in this
country? Under the same reasoning, should the Nigerian, Sudanese,
Namibian, Mexican, Colombian, Chinese, Indonesian, Filipino, or
Brazilian citizens emigrating to the United States today receive ben-
efits because they have suffered, consciously or otherwise, from
events that took place in the United States long before they arrived?
When does it all end? The Fourteenth Amendment provides the an-
swer. It orders, "IN]or shall any State ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. ' 288 Whether we
choose to learn history's lesson that racial discrimination is imper-
missible, only time will tell.
As long as we insist on highlighting our racial differences, in-
stead of embracing what we share in common, race will always play
a hurtful role in America. Until we learn that racial distinctions
were wrong, are wrong, and always will be wrong, the present effects
of past discrimination will always exist. Each day that the govern-
ment insists that we consider race before we award a contract, offer
employment, or grant admission to a school, is another day we are
287. For a discussion of the purported distinction between a wrongful discrimina-
tory act and a discriminatory act with mere incidental effects, see supra note
282.
288. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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further delayed from Reverend Martin Luther King's dream; and
justice delayed is justice denied.
Michael A.B. Turner
